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1-Introduction
In 2011 Mr. Gerecht, a former CIA officer, who is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Mr. Dubowitz who is executive director of the foundation raise this question: "If we buy oil from despotic states, are we somehow complicit in their crimes?" They suggest an Iranian-Oil-Free Zone in order to control ambiguous military and nuclear program of the Iranian state (Gerecht and Dubowitz, 2011) . Also recently Eighty-three U.S. Senators wrote President Obama regarding their serious concerns on ongoing negotiations with Iran and necessity of planning for further radical oil sanction if the negotiations fail: "We must signal unequivocally to Iran that rejecting negotiations and continuing its nuclear weapon program will lead to much more dramatic sanctions, including further limitations on Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products". 3 We are interested in analyzing the dynamic interconnections between Iranian oil supply and global oil prices. How costly will be Iranian Oil Free Zone for global economy? Does Iranian oil supply matter for oil prices? We deviate from existing studies 4 in which the authors examine different political economy effects and consequences of sanctions for Iran. We add to the literature by investigating the external consequences of Iran oil sanctions for oil prices.
1 http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Oil/8842808 2 Also see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16348633 3 http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/eighty-three-senators-outline-core-principles-of-afinal-agreement-with-iran-in-letter-to-president-obama 4 See the recent studies of Farzanegan (2011 Farzanegan ( , 2012 , Dizaji and Bergeijk (2013) , Dizaji and Farzanegan (2014) , Farzanegan (2013) , and Naghavi and Pignataro (2013) . See Appendix A for a summary of main findings of these studies. capita of the world. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 presents our methodology, data, and results. Section 4 concludes the paper with some policy recommendations
2-Review of the theoretical and empirical literature
The theoretical framework of our empirical analysis is explained in the related literature on market power of different members of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 5 http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11011
Countries (OPEC). There are several studies on the behavior of OPEC in the oil market.
Dominant firm behavior and cartel behavior are examples of such models.
In our study, we analyze the response of global oil prices to the shocks in negative changes of Iranian oil exports, controlling for the non-Iranian oil supply 6 . For this purpose, the related literature is divided into two categories: the first part discusses dominant firm behavior within the OPEC, while the second part looks at some studies exploring the OPEC from the perspective of one-part cartel behavior.
Dominant firm model
In this model markets consists of a dominant producer, which has control over the price, and many small firms. Two branches in the literature have discussed this model. One branch considers Saudi Arabia's role as a dominant producer within the OPEC, while the other branch defines a core group of countries as dominant producers.
Saudi Arabia as the dominant firm
Consistent with the dominant firm model, Erickson (1980) analyzes the oil market claiming that Saudi Arabia is the dominant producer which determines the price. Iran, as one of the large producers in OPEC, behaves competitively. In fact, production quantity cannot fluctuate as much for the other large producers as it can for Saudi Arabia. Plaut (1981) 
A core group as the dominant firm
Another branch of literature tries to show that OPEC power is concentrated in a group of countries called the core group. Daly et al. (1982) believe that large reserves, low population, and barren desert geography are common characteristics of members in the core group. Their study identifies Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Libya as the core group in OPEC. These core countries have the potential to significantly increase their exports in case of certain economic and political circumstances. According to Singer (1983) , Saudi Arabia and some smaller Arab countries are able to close the gap between world oil demand and other suppliers' production. These countries are able to affect the oil price by adjusting their production. Dahl and Yucel (1990) Hansen and Lindholt (2008) show that the characteristics of dominant producer fitted the OPEC core group after 1994.
One part cartel model
In contrast to the first group and its subgroups, where Saudi Arabia plays the role of a dominant producer or forms part of a dominant group, this sub-section discusses OPEC as a one-part cartel. There exist different kinds of cartels in the related literature; some focusing on price and some on volume. Others include restrictions pertaining to customers, patents, products or allocation. In the literature on OPEC behavior there are examples of cartels restricting price or output. Estimating OPEC market behavior, Griffin (1985) tests four alternative hypotheses relating to cartel, competitive, target revenue, and property rights in the period from 1971 to 1983. Different theories of his study are frequently observed to be rejected; however, the partial market sharing cartel was the only one which could not be rejected for all eleven members of OPEC. Based on his empirical results, he states that "OPEC appears to be a real cartel with at least partially effective output coordination". Later on, Jones (1990) extended Griffin's estimates and finds that the partial market sharing cartel regime is the one that most of the OPEC members followed in the period from 1983 to 1988.
In his paper, Loderer (1985) looks at price impact as a condition for any effective cartel.
He tests the null hypothesis of "OPEC is unable to affect market prices" versus the alternative of "price impact hypothesis" from 1974 to 1983. His data supports the cartel hypothesis for the period 1981 to 1983. Updating Griffin's (1985) consider the whole organization as a one-part cartel, depending on cartel type, a change in price or quantity is expected to be experienced in the market under an embargo.
In next section we show the dynamic of international oil prices response to Iran oil sanctions, controlling for other important factors.
3-Methodology, data and estimation results

Data description
We are interested in examining the dynamic relationship between the Iranian oil export shocks and response of international oil prices. To do this, we use asymmetric shocks in 
Methodology
We estimate a multivariate unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) model (see Sims, 1980) 8 using the "decreasing oil exports of Iran" as a shock variable and crude oil global oil prices as the main response variables in addition to controlling for non-Iranian oil supply and world income per capita. Following equation shows the VAR model:
Where is a vector of k endogenous variables, is a vector of d exogenous variables, 1 ,…, A p and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, p is the optimum number of lags, and is a vector of innovations . These innovations should be uncorrelated both with their own lagged values and with all of the right-hand side variables. One of the major advantages of using the VAR is addressing the endogeneity issue due to strong interconnections between oil prices, oil supply and global economic growth. All variables in the VAR are endogenous which mitigate prior invalid restrictions on variables. We use impulse response (IRF) and variance decomposition (VDA) analytical tools on the basis of estimated VAR model in order to respond to our research question.
By using the IRF we can measure the size and statistical significance of global oil prices to one standard deviation increase in absolute negative changes of Iranian oil exports (e.g., from -1% to -2%). The IRF shows the response of oil prices after initial negative shock in Iranian oil export in forthcoming years. To judge about statistical significance of such response we report 68% confidence intervals around the main response (see Sims and Zha, 1999 who recommend this). We employ 1000 Monte Carlo simulations to build these confidence intervals. The response is said to be statistically insignificant when the confidence intervals include the horizontal zero line.
We also use the VDC tool. Using VDC, we study the relative importance of negative changes of Iranian oil exports in explanting the variance of global oil prices, besides non-Iranian oil supply and world economic growth. A shock in Iranian oil exports directly affects the variable itself but also it transfers to other variables in the VAR system with time lags. Selecting the optimum lag is also important. We use 6 years lag of variables in the VAR system which is recommended on the basis of Akaike information criterion (AIC). Before presenting and discussing the IRF and VDC results, we need to make sure that the estimated VAR model is correctly specified. There are two main post-estimation tests: the first test is VAR stability condition check. For this purpose we look at the AR Roots Graph (see Figure 1) . This shows inverse roots of the characteristic AR polinominal (see Lütkepohl, 1991 ).
The VAR model is said to be stationary or stable if all roots have absolute value less than one and lie inside the unit circle (IHS Global Inc., 2013, p. 556). In the case of VAR instability some key statistics such as impulse response error bands will not be reliable. In our model, as is shown in Figure 1 , there are no roots lying on the unit circle (or outside of it), and this suggests that our model is stable. In other words, the influence of the shock for all variables decreases over time. The second test is related to the VAR Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial residual serial correlation. We use Autocorrelation LM Test (see Johansen (1995, p. 22) for the formula of the LM statistic). Results are shown in Table 1 . The null hypothesis of no serial correlation of order 7 cannot be rejected. This provided more assurance that we do not have a specific problem with omitted relevant variables in the VAR system. The VDC analysis results are also shown in Table 2 . We show the percentage variance of each variable which can be explained by changes in other variables in the VAR system during the years after initial shock. The larger is the percent variance of a specific variable due to changes of another variable, the more important is the latter variable. Looking at variance decomposition of real world oil prices, we observe some general patterns: the role of negative changes in Iranian oil exports in explaining the variance of world oil prices during the first 5 years after shock is fluctuating around 5%, while the relative importance of two other variables namely non-oil Iranian oil supply and world GDP per capita is increasing over time. In the 5 th year after shock, negative changes of Iranian oil exports explain 5.17% of variance of oil prices, while the same figure for non-Iranian oil supply and world economic growth are 8.93 and 12.09%. The short term explanatory power of shocks to Iranian oil exports are more important compared to other variables in the system in explaining oil price variance. However, the most parts of changes in oil prices are explained by the past own innovations.
Variance decomposition of negative changes of Iranian oil exports shows the increasing importance of non-Iranian oil supply and world GDP per capita in the subsequent 5 years after initial shock. This also fits into our theoretical discussion in section 2.
Variance decomposition for the non-Iranian oil supply shows the relative importance of world economic growth in explaining its forthcoming variations. The importance of world GDP per capita in explaining the variance of non-Iranian oil supply is increasing from 33% in the first year after shock to 52% in the 5 th year. Finally variance of world GDP per capita is mostly explained by its own past innovations.
4-Concluding remarks
Sanctions show the immediate increasing and statistically significant response of oil prices to Iran oil sanctions. This response during the first year after shock, however, loses its statistical significance in the next years following shock.
